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The competition for AI supremacy between the United States and China is often described as intense, yet its complexities remain largely invisible to most users. This is because the battle is not fought on a single front but across multiple, interconnected technological layers. To understand this race, we must examine the entire stack, from the AI applications we use daily down to the fundamental hardware that powers them.
For most people, interaction with AI happens at the application layer. This is where products like ChatGPT, Claude, Notebook LM, and Mannis (Manis) are built and used. The competition here is incredibly fierce, but not for the reasons one might assume.
The barrier to entry for creating an AI application is surprisingly low. With accessible APIs and open-source models, developers can build and launch applications with minimal cost. Consequently, the market is flooded with new tools and services. However, the applications themselves are entirely dependent on the large language models (LLMs) beneath them, and competing at *that* layer is an entirely different game.
Innovating state-of-the-art large language models requires staggering computational resources, creating a massive barrier to entry. A prime example is Meta's Llama 3.1 model, released in July 2024.
To make this feasible, companies use parallel processing. Meta employed 16,000 H100 GPUs, an investment of $400-$640 million in hardware alone, to reduce the training time to about three months. This level of investment is a prerequisite for competing with leaders like OpenAI, Anthropic, and Meta. In China, companies like Alibaba, DeepSeek, Baidu (BU), Moonshot, and ByteDance (Bite Dance) are competing at this formidable level.
The ability to innovate in LLMs is directly tied to computing infrastructure—massive clusters of advanced GPUs. The US has a significant lead, which it actively protects through export controls.
This creates a critical strategic disadvantage. If Chinese companies like DeepSeek had access to only half the GPUs Meta used for training, their development cycles would be significantly longer, potentially causing them to fall behind in the rapid pace of AI innovation.
Faced with these restrictions, Chinese companies have been forced to innovate more efficiently. The result has been shocking to the industry.
In December 2024, DeepSeek released its V3 model, a highly capable LLM that competes with top Western models. The key insight is how it was built:
This efficiency demonstrates that raw computational power is not the only path to advancement. If China continues to pioneer methods for training high-performance models with less compute, it could undermine the US's primary strategic advantage: control over the supply of advanced chips.
The competition ultimately boils down to the production of advanced semiconductors. China's "Made in China 2025" policy aims to achieve 70% self-sufficiency in core materials and technologies, seeking independence from foreign suppliers like NVIDIA and TSMC (Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company).
However, manufacturing cutting-edge chips presents the highest barrier of all:
Without access to EUV technology, China faces extreme difficulty in manufacturing competitive advanced chips domestically, keeping it reliant on a supply chain that the US can control.
While the competition rages across the layers of LLMs, infrastructure, supply, and manufacturing, its ultimate value is determined at the application layer. The billions invested in chips and data centers are a bet on the transformative applications that will be built on top of them—in healthcare, finance, science, and transportation.
The real competition, therefore, is not just about who has the most GPUs, but about who can leverage these technological breakthroughs to create the most impactful and disruptive applications. The outcome of this layered race will define the future of global technology and economics for decades to come.