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Why are two of the world's most dynamic and similar superpowers constantly at odds? Author Dan Wong offers a compelling new lens: the fundamental clash between a "lawyer society" and an "engineering state."
The central thesis of Dan Wong's book, Breakneck: China's Quest to Engineer the Future, is that the U.S. and China, despite their similarities, are fundamentally shaped by their ruling elites: America by lawyers and China by engineers. This distinction explains their divergent approaches to governance, infrastructure, social policy, and international competition.
Wong argues that Americans and Chinese are surprisingly similar. Both peoples embrace dynamism, reject stasis, and exhibit a high degree of hustle and a willingness to take shortcuts. This stands in contrast to more stability-oriented cultures found in Europe and Japan. The tragedy, and comedy, of their geopolitical rivalry is that these two akin civilizations are locked in a struggle fueled by mutual misunderstanding.
China's identity as an "engineering state" is deeply embedded in its leadership. For a period in the early 2000s, all nine members of the Politburo Standing Committee held engineering degrees. This technical background shapes a worldview where society is treated as a system to be optimized and controlled.
The United States, by contrast, was founded as a "lawyer society." The Declaration of Independence reads like a legal brief, and a disproportionate number of its leaders, from the Founding Fathers to the present Biden administration, have legal training.
The engineering mindset becomes dangerous when applied not just to physical infrastructure but to human populations. Wong highlights two catastrophic examples of social engineering:
This tendency to treat people as variables in a system is the fundamental pathology of the engineering state.
Observing China holds a mirror to America's own challenges. The U.S. struggles with scarcity—especially in housing and infrastructure—while China, for all its faults, has mastered the politics of abundance, building vast quantities of everything from homes to highways.
The U.S. must ask itself a difficult question: Can it preserve its pluralistic, lawyerly virtues while rediscovering the political will to build and govern effectively? The American system worked for the lawyers and engineers who built the Hoover Dam and went to the Moon. The key shift, Wong suggests, occurred in the 1960s when public trust in technocratic authority collapsed, and the legal profession transformed from deal-makers into litigious regulators focused on suing "the bastards."
The long-term contest may be decided by which system works best for the majority of its people. China's model offers rapid execution and tangible infrastructure but at the cost of freedom and potential instability. The American model offers liberty and debate but is often paralyzed by procedure and struggles to deliver material benefits for its middle class.
There is no perfect hybrid system, but the U.S. retains a crucial advantage: its capacity for self-criticism and reform. The ultimate question is whether it can overcome its own lawyerly inertia to build a future that matches its ambitions.